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Abstract
The primary evidence about the factors determining successful self-governance of common-pool
resources (CPR) has come from case studies. More recently, this observational evidence has been
complemented by insights from economic experiments. Here we advance a third approach in which the
role of local deliberation about the management of a ﬁshery resource is investigated in a ﬁeld
experiment. Using three control and three treatment communities in a freshwater ﬁshery, we tested
whether participation in developing speciﬁc measures for community-based sustainable CPR
management increased the willingness to contribute to the implementation of these measures. Each
community was also exposed to information about their community leaders' advice about the proposed
measures. Both participation and leader advice affected the willingness of participants to contribute in
one of three proposed measures. However, the strongest inﬂuence on individual willingness to
contribute was exerted by the individual beliefs about the cooperation of others in CPR management.
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Abstract 
The primary evidence about the factors determining successful self-governance of 
common-pool resources (CPR) has come from case studies. More recently, this 
observational evidence has been complemented by insights from economic experiments. 
Here we advance a third approach in which the role of local deliberation about the 
management of a fishery resource is investigated in a field experiment. Using three 
control and three treatment communities in a freshwater fishery, we tested whether 
participation in developing specific measures for community-based sustainable CPR 
management increased the willingness to contribute to the implementation of these 
measures. Each community was also exposed to information about their community 
leaders' advice about the proposed measures. Both participation and leader advice 
affected the willingness of participants to contribute in one of three proposed measures. 
However, the strongest influence on individual willingness to contribute was exerted by 
the individual beliefs about the cooperation of others in CPR management. 
Keywords: Deliberation, Participation, Willingness to contribute, Beliefs, Fishing 
resources, Field experiment 
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1. Introduction 
 
Common-pool resources (CPR) are defined as natural or man-made resources in which 
(a) exclusion of users is nontrivial (but not necessarily impossible) and (b) resource use 
by one user decreases the availability of the resource for other users (Ostrom et al., 
1992). At least since Gordon (1954), it has been known that individuals jointly using a 
CPR have incentives to ignore the external harm they impose on others, leading to 
outcomes that are not rational from the perspective of the group. Garrett Hardin (1968) 
argued that the users of common resources are trapped in an inevitable dilemma that 
leads to the destruction of the resources on which they depend. Policy proposals for 
resolving CPR dilemmas often follow one of two alternatives. The first approach is to use 
a governmental organization to restrain people from extracting the common resource by 
fines or other forms of sanctioning. The second approach solves the dilemma by 
privatization, i.e., by defining property rights that transform a common resource into a 
private one. 
 Both approaches can be difficult to implement. In many cases, governmental 
intervention is prohibitively expensive. Especially in settings where the common 
resources are spread in large and remote areas, sufficient monitoring is impossible with 
limited resources, a situation often encountered in developing countries. Furthermore, 
there are numerous examples where governmental intervention has failed (e.g. IUCN, 
1999) because common resource users did not perceive the intrusion of external agents as 
legitimate and therefore did not follow the imposed rules (Anderies et al., 2004). 
Privatization, on the other hand, does not solve the dilemma in case of migratory 
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resources (Clark, 1990) and raises difficult questions concerning the division of the 
property rights (Baland and Platteau, 1998). 
A growing body of research suggests self-governance by local user groups as an 
alternative to the two standard approaches. There is considerable evidence that self-
governance by local users can be successful (Acheson, 1975; Cordell, 1989; Ostrom, 
1990; Ostrom and Gardner, 1993; Begossi, 1995; Leal, 1998; Ostrom et al., 2002; Bray et 
al., 2005). A rapidly growing theoretical and empirical literature including laboratory 
experiments explores the key factors that affect the likelihood of successful cooperation 
in the provision of public goods and in the management of common-pool resources 
(Ostrom, 2000). From a development perspective, factors that can potentially be actively 
promoted as a means to improve cooperative self-governance are of particular interest. 
A central finding from laboratory experiments is that face-to-face communication 
among members of a group is one of the most effective factors promoting cooperation in 
groups (Hackett et al. 1994; Ostrom and Walker, 1997). This effect of communication is 
not consistent with currently accepted economic theory, because verbal agreements in 
these experiments are not enforced (Ostrom, 2000). However, the finding agrees with 
experience from real-world settings. In the context of common resource management, the 
communication process may help establishing trust and cooperation among resource 
users, which is essential for avoiding excessive extraction of common resources 
(Cardenas et al., 2000). Another finding from the laboratory is that many individuals are 
conditionally cooperative, i.e. their level of cooperation depends positively on the level of 
cooperation of the others (Fischbacher et al., 2001). Field studies involving donations 
confirm that behaviour is affected by information that affects individual beliefs about the 
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behaviour of others (e.g. Frey and Meier, 2004; Shang and Croson, 2005). The 
availability of such information can be enhanced through opportunities for 
communication (Ostrom, 2007). 
One possibility to stimulate communication about resource use in a meaningful 
way is by allowing public participation in decisions about resource management. Public 
involvement in a deliberative decision process may have benefits over and above those of 
learning about efficient and sustainable resource use and management. Resource users 
who can themselves have an impact on the rules guiding resource management may for 
this very reason be more willing to actually follow those rules even if the rules restrict 
their short-term gains from resource extraction (Ostrom, 2000; Stiglitz, 2002). 
The current evidence about effects of public participation on the likelihood of 
cooperation in resource management is largely based on observational studies (e.g. Patel 
et al. 2007). However, with observational evidence alone it is difficult to isolate the role 
of participation and understand its importance for the likelihood of cooperation and other 
forms of collective action relative to other important factors such as individual 
characteristics or existing beliefs about the cooperation of others. 
We are not aware of any study that has experimentally examined the effects of 
public participation on the willingness to cooperate in CPR management or in the 
provision of public goods in a real-world situation.  In this paper, we call this approach a 
field experiment because it stands between an observational field study and a laboratory 
experiment, taking the component ―field‖ from the first and the component ―experiment‖ 
from the second. Perhaps the closest to our study is a recent experiment which examined 
the effect of a participatory educational program on the participants‘ willingness to 
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contribute to a public good (Urama and Hodge, 2006). In this study, the authors report 
that participation can ―positively‖ affect responses in a survey; that is, people stated a 
higher willingness to contribute to a public good. 
Here we present the result from a field experiment with six fishing communities 
facing problems of over-fishing. Fishermen in three out of the six sampled communities 
participated in the development of proposals for a more sustainable fishery resource 
management. We then used a survey to examine and test if participation increased the 
willingness to contribute to the implementation of each of three final proposals. In 
addition, we examined whether participants‘ beliefs about the willingness of other 
participants to contribute to a proposal determined their own willingness to contribute to 
the same proposal. To examine the robustness of stated contributions to external 
information, we further tested how the opinion of local community leaders about the 
proposed measures affected the responses. Both participation and leader opinion affected 
the willingness of participants to contribute in one of three resource management 
proposals. However, these effects were weak relative to the influence of individual 
characteristics, in particular the individual beliefs about the cooperation of others in 
sustainable management actions. 
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we review relevant 
literature on public deliberation and its effect on cooperation in CPR management. The 
third and forth sections describe the study area and methods. Section 5 presents the 
results, followed by the conclusions. 
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2. Public deliberation and cooperation in CPR management 
 
2.1. Public deliberation 
 
The type of public participation we examined in the present study is a form of 
―deliberation‖ as defined by political scientists (Chambers, 2003; Carpini et al., 2004).1 
Chambers (2003, p. 309) defines deliberation as follows: 
 
Generally speaking, we can say that deliberation is debate and discussion aimed at 
producing reasonable, well-informed opinions in which participants are willing to 
revise preferences in light of discussion, new information, and claims made by fellow 
participants. Although consensus need not be the ultimate aim of deliberation, and 
participants are expected to pursue their interests, an overarching interest in the 
legitimacy of outcomes (understood as justification to all affected) ideally 
characterizes deliberation. 
 
The term public deliberation emerges from deliberative democratic theory where 
public deliberation is seen as a cornerstone of participatory democracy and representative 
government (e.g. Dewey, 1954; Dahl, 1989; Habermas, 1996). In contrast to economic 
understandings of democracy in which fixed preferences and interests compete via fair 
                                                 
1
 The form of public participation pursued in this study has also been termed participatory research (Wiber 
et al., 2004). Participatory research (Brandao, 1999) or ―action research‖ (Thiollent, 2000) is a 
communication-intensive process with the aim to find out how the efficiency of resource management can 
be increased. A central aim of participatory research is that resource users with different social conditions 
learn independently of external intervention (like the government) to plan, organize and achieve changes in 
resource extraction in a conscious, free and intelligent way with the maximum reflection possible (Barbier, 
2002). 
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mechanisms of aggregation, deliberative democracy focuses on communicative processes 
of opinion and will formation that precedes voting (Carpini et al., 2004). 
In their review of the empirical literature on public deliberation and citizen 
engagement, Carpini et al. (2004) find that it is generally expected that public 
deliberation is a means to more sound individual and collective decisions and to greater 
support for responsive public officials (e.g. Gastil, 2000). While much of the empirical 
literature focuses on intermediary variables, such as political learning (as measured by 
pre-post tests of factual knowledge), perceived legitimacy, or consensus, rather than more 
direct efficiency benefits, the evidence for beneficial effects on those variables is 
substantial. 
However, not all studies are universally positive in their conclusions about the 
benefits of public deliberation. Not all citizens may wish to engage more directly in 
political decision-making through deliberation (e.g. Sunstein, 2001). Moreover, it has 
been pointed out that public deliberation can also be unrepresentative, subject to 
conscious manipulation, and disconnected from actual decision-making. Thus, 
satisfaction with deliberative participation depends heavily on whether the form of 
deliberation is suitable to the issue and the groups involved (Mansbridge, 1983). 
 
2.2. Participation and efficiency in CPR management 
 
Common-pool resource dilemmas, especially in developing countries, have been a key 
interest of researchers examining how deliberation (and communication more generally) 
can promote efficient resource use through enhanced cooperation (e.g. Basurto, 2005; 
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Armitage, 2005; Primmer and Kyllonen, 2006). Recently, researchers have 
complemented the findings of these observational studies by laboratory experiments in 
which opportunities to communicate could be directly manipulated in situations similar to 
CPR settings (reviewed by Ostrom, 2006). 
Case-study research has found that involving stakeholders can promote 
sustainable management (e.g. Patel et al., 2007), but it has also been found that 
community-based project design with participatory mechanisms may not solve 
management without concomitant political and statutory backing (Carter and Hill, 2007). 
Furthermore, it appears that field settings, unlike experimental settings, produce highly 
variable results which highlight the important role of contextual factors beyond those 
examined in the laboratory experiments (Carpini et al., 2004; Levitt and List, 2007). This 
result suggests that interesting further insights could be gained by experiments that 
manipulate opportunities for communication in a field setting. 
In assessing more specific hypothesized effects of public deliberation on 
cooperation in resource management it seems useful to distinguish effects through 
impacts of deliberation on the individually available information set (including 
information about efficiency gains of cooperation and about the likely behaviour of other 
individuals) and effects mediated through perceived ―procedural‖ benefits of 
participatory decision-making. 
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2.2.1. Effects through the available information set 
 
The communication involved in participatory approaches may promote cooperation in 
common-pool resource management in at least two important ways.  
First, communication may help individuals to establish trust and mutually agree 
on cooperation. It is well known that many people follow rules only if they believe that 
others follow and enforce these rules as well (e.g. Bromley, 1992; Fehr et al., 2002). 
There is empirical evidence from the laboratory as well as from the field that 
contributions to a public good depend on the contributions of peers (Shang and Croson, 
2005). For example, holding a positive belief about the likely contribution of others 
implies that people are more likely to spend money for charitable donations or are more 
likely to pay their taxes correctly (Frey and Meier, 2004; Fellner et al., 2006). As a 
consequence, making one small change in the structure of laboratory experiments by 
enabling subjects to engage in face-to-face communication between decision rounds 
enables them to approach socially optimal behaviour rather than severely overexploiting 
the commons (Ostrom, 2007). 
Second, communication can improve cooperation because additional information 
can be used in solving complex resource issues (e.g. Luskin et al., 2002). Randall and 
Hoehn (2000) suggested that behaviour is influenced by resource-quality information. 
Information gathering and provision by local leaders can play a key role in consensus 
building and thus facilitate collective action (Palmer, 2007). Urama and Hodge (2006) 
argue that preferences about complex resource issues are ―weakly held due to an 
incomplete appreciation of the welfare implications of the environmental change 
 10 
scenario(s)‖. This seems to be confirmed by recent studies contrasting responses after 
group deliberation with responses by isolated survey respondents (Macmillan et al., 
2002; Macmillan et al., 2006; Alvarez-Farizo and Hanley, 2006; Alvarez-Farizo et al., 
2007). One way to isolate the role of exchanging information about the welfare 
implications of alternative management is to experimentally study the effects of 
providing leader opinions to ordinary citizens with low levels of factual knowledge. In 
choices about complex resource issues, it has been shown that access to such information, 
particularly advice by trusted experts with known political orientation, can enhance the 
consistency of individual decisions (Lupia, 1994; Lupia and Matsusaka, 2004; Schläpfer 
et al., 2008). 
 
2.2.2. Effects through perceived procedural benefits 
 
Giving people the opportunity to voice their opinion increases their sense that the process 
is fair and the outcome legitimate, regardless of whether they agree substantively with the 
outcome (Tyler, 1994, 2001). Experimental research on jury deliberations suggests that 
the perception of ―procedural justice‖ (i.e., the perception that the process by which a 
decision was reached was fair) leads to greater support for the group‘s decision (Carpini 
et al., 2004). Frey et al. (2004) and Stutzer and Frey (2006) argue that people derive 
utility from the processes involved in decision making over and above the utility gained 
from outcomes. 
In the context of resource management, Pouta et al. (2002) compared two 
planning methods in otherwise uniformly designed valuation scenarios, the actual 
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planning, which the public criticized as being bureaucratic, and a hypothetical one in 
which the planning procedure was described as participatory. Their results indicated that 
the planning method had a significant effect on people‘s willingness to contribute to 
nature conservation. In addition, procedural effects may also feedback on the available 
information set, as individuals whose opinion counts in politics are more likely to gather 
and process relevant information (Benz and Stutzer, 2004). 
The present study contributes to the literature by experimentally examining 
effects of a participatory process on willingness to contribute to sustainable common 
resource management. Furthermore, given a complex resource issue in which payoffs of 
cooperation may not be as easily understood as in previous laboratory experiments, we 
also experimentally examined how willingness to contribute to sustainable management 
is affected by advice from local community leaders. 
 
3. Study area 
 
Our research was conducted with fishermen in the protected area ―Área de Proteção 
Ambiental Lago de Pedra do Cavalo‖ (APA) in the state of Bahia in Brazil. A large 
fraction of the individuals living in the APA are fishermen and farmers, and the natural 
resources in the protected area provide the basis for living for most of the local 
population. The lake Pedra do Cavalo is also of major importance for the State of Bahia; 
it provides water to four million people. About 40‘000 families live in the APA, and most 
of them depend directly on at least one of the three common resources fish, game and 
natural and planted vegetation. An earlier research project in two communities of the area 
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had revealed that these resources are indeed not used in a sustainable way (Cavalcanti, 
2003). One of the main reasons was the overexploitation and degradation of the 
resources. According to the local fishermen, the decrease of the fish stock, which is of 
concern in the present study, is likely due to the fact that most fishermen catch small fish 
and do not stop fishing during the recovery period. From 2002 to 2004 the Centro de 
Recursos Ambientais Bahia (Environmental Resources Centre of the State of Bahia) and 
the local University of Feira de Santana-Brazil worked together to form a Management 
Council (MC) for this area with the aim of promoting discussion of the local problems 
and of finding solutions jointly with the local stakeholders. The members of the MC are 
the communities‘ leaders, representatives of public and private institutions, NGOs and 
the municipal governments located in the protected area. It was hoped, that the MC as a 
new institution will help in developing practical and relevant proposals that foster the 
sustainable use of the resources in the APA. 
 
4. Methods 
 
4.1. Overview of the experimental design 
 
The participatory process that we initiated involved six distinct steps (Figure 1):  (1) a 
first interaction with the Management Council (MC) of the protected area, (2) a survey of 
socioeconomic variables in the study communities, (3) participatory development of 
proposals about common resource managements in three communities, (4) development 
of final proposals with the MC, (5) solicitation of leader opinions on the proposals, and 
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(6) a survey of beliefs and stated willingness to contribute to the proposals. The 
procedure is explained in detail in the following section.  
 
4.2. Interaction and survey process 
 
Step 1: Interaction with the Management Council of the protected area 
 
Our interaction began with the Management Council (MC) of the APA. In a meeting, we 
asked the members of this institution about their opinions regarding our research project 
and if they were willing to support the participatory process. All MC members responded 
positively and agreed to take part in the participatory process. 
 
Step 2: Survey of socioeconomic variables through the first questionnaire 
 
As a next step, we conducted a questionnaire in the six fishing communities A, B, C, D, E 
and F
2
. The goal of this step was to obtain an overview of the current fishing situation 
and socioeconomic variables. The interviews were conducted in August 2006 by the first 
author and three trained helpers. The helpers were biology students in the third and 
seventh semester of the University of Feira de Santana-Bahia and were familiar with the 
situation of the fishermen in this area. In total, we interviewed 197 fishermen (Table 1) 
before the following intervention steps. 
                                                 
2
 The real names of the communities are not revealed to ensure anonymity.  
 14 
 
<Insert Table 1 here > 
 
Step 3: Implementation of participation in three communities 
 
We assigned three of the six communities (A, B and E) arbitrarily to a treatment group 
where we conducted meetings with the goal to develop concrete proposals to improve the 
‗fishing situation‘, or the management of the fishery resource. In A 15 fishermen showed 
up in the meeting, in B 16 fishermen and in E 26 fishermen.  The meetings were held in 
August/September 2006 and lasted 4–5 hours each. 
A participatory meeting consisted of two parts. In the first part, we presented the 
fishermen the data of the questionnaire from step 2. Thus they learned what the beliefs, 
perceptions and knowledge of members of their own community were. In the second, 
much longer part of the meeting we started a discussion between the fishermen about the 
main problems related to the use of the fishing resources and asked them to develop 
proposals on how to solve these problems. We tried to be as neutral as possible and to not 
influence the development of the proposals. Each community developed 3–4 proposals. 
For each meeting, we recorded a short protocol summarizing arguments and specific 
proposals. 
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Step 4: Development of final proposals with the MC 
 
Following the meetings with the communities, we presented and discussed the proposals 
with members of the MC. We asked them which proposals in their opinion were likely to 
successfully promote sustainable resource management. We tried to focus on the 
practicability of each proposal and its potential for implementation and enforcement 
within a short period of time. The representatives chose and modified some of the 
original proposals and thus helped us formulating the final proposals which we used in 
the following steps (see Results section for proposals). 
 
Step 5: Solicitation of leader opinions 
 
In each community, we identified the community leader
3
 (except in community D for 
which we provided two leader opinions) and asked them about their opinion regarding 
each of the final proposals. More specifically, we recorded for each proposal if the leader 
had ―no doubt‖, ―a bit of doubt‖ or ―much doubt‖ that the proposal would improve the 
situation for the fishermen. 
 
Step 6: Survey of beliefs and stated willingness to contribute to the proposals 
 
After the intervention (steps 3–5) we interviewed 143 participants with a second 
questionnaire. In each of the six communities we provided the fishermen with basic 
                                                 
3
 The leaders had been elected by the inhabitants of their communities during meetings held to form the 
MC. The role of the leader is to represent his/her community in the meetings of the MC and thereafter 
inform the fishermen about the decisions taken in these meetings.   
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information about the participatory process which had produced the proposals and with 
the final proposals themselves. To test for stability of responses in the face of political 
advice (Lupia, 1994; Schläpfer et al., 2008), a randomly selected subset of respondents 
(half of the participants in each community) also received their local leaders‘ 
recommendations on each proposal, whereas the other half did not receive this 
information. In this way, we could examine whether and how participation or opinions 
from leaders affected the individual fishermen‘s willingness to contribute to the 
developed proposals, alongside with socioeconomic variables and beliefs about the 
contribution of others.  
Table 1 shows the number of participants in the second questionnaire in each 
community. A total of 143 individuals 72 percent of those participating in the first 
interview) could be interviewed in the second questionnaire. Sixty-nine fishermen took 
part in the participatory process, and thirty-three of them were informed about the 
opinion from their leaders. The remaining 74 fishermen were not involved in the 
participatory process, but 36 out of them were provided with the opinion from their 
leaders. 
 
4.3. Hypotheses 
 
We tested the following hypotheses: (a) the participatory process and the leader opinions 
affect willingness to contribute; and (b) socioeconomic variables and individual beliefs 
also influence willingness to contribute. More precisely, we hypothesized that the 
participation affects the willingness to contribute positively, whereas the influence of the 
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leaders depends on the content of their opinions. Furthermore, we expected that there is a 
positive correlation between beliefs about contributions of others and own willingness to 
contribute.  
 
4.4. Statistical analysis 
 
We used ordinary least squares (OLS) regression and ordinal regression (logit link) to 
analyze the influence of participation, opinion leaders and individual beliefs on the 
willingness to contribute to suggested proposals for sustainable fishing. Additionally, we 
used OLS regression to test the effects of the socioeconomic variables education, age, 
gender and religiosity on individual beliefs. We summarized the results of these analyses 
in tables containing the regression coefficients with their standard errors and t-values. A 
more rigorous way to test the significance of the above regressors on response variables 
is the mixed-model analysis of variance/deviance approach (ANOVA-tables in the 
appendix; McCullagh and Nelder 1989). This approach includes the additional 
explanatory terms community (n = 6) and groups (n = 13) as random factors in the 
analysis. In this case, the influence of participation is tested against the variation between 
communities. However, this test uses an F-value with 1 and 4 degrees of freedom only 
and thus has low statistical power. Therefore, we focus more on the regression analysis 
for interpretation of significances. The mixed-model ANOVA did allow us to test 
whether the variation among communities or groups was significant, which was never the 
case. 
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First, we fitted a complex model which included socioeconomic and belief 
variables as covariates together with the two presence/absence factors participation and 
leader opinion. Within the factor leader opinion, we fitted a contrast reflecting the degree 
of support of the opinion leader for a proposal. In the second model we omitted this 
contrast. In the third model we additionally omitted the socioeconomic variables. In the 
fourth model (only used for proposal two, see below), we kept one belief variable 
together with the two factors participation and leader opinion as explanatory terms. In the 
fifth model, we further removed the remaining belief variable so that only participation 
and leader opinion were left as explanatory terms. We provide ANOVA tables for the 
first and the third model (Appendix). 
 
5. Data overview and description of the final proposals  
 
In this section, we first provide an overview of the fishing behaviour of our subject pool 
and then describe the three proposals that were developed by the fishermen and selected 
and finalized by the MC. In addition, we report the stated voluntary contributions to each 
of these proposals (sample pooled over all of the six communities). 
 
5.1. Current fishing practice in the APA 
 
Fishery is a traditionally male profession; hence, it is not surprising that 87% of the 197 
fishermen who completed the first questionnaire were men. 122 of them catch both fish 
and shrimp, and the remaining catch predominantly either fish or shrimp. On average, 
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fishermen catch 11.45 kilograms of fish and 79.73 litters of shrimp per week. The 
participants in this first survey were on average 36.5 years old and had 3.7 years of 
school education. Most of them were catholic and considered themselves as ―somewhat‖ 
religious.  
 
5.2. Developed proposals 
 
Proposal 1: Selling of catch in one centralized place though the “Colonia” 
 
A first suggestion by some fishermen was to create a centralized market where their catch 
would be sold exclusively. The aim of this proposal was that the catch could be better 
controlled and the sale of illegal catch (small fish) discouraged. Their idea was to use the 
network of an existing organization, the ―Colonia‖.4 The proposal was to use the Colonia 
to establish a place where fishermen bring their catch and organize the selling of the 
catch. We asked the fishermen how many hours they were willing to volunteer in this 
place per week. Nearly all fishermen were willing to volunteer at least some hours. On 
average, the interviewed fishermen were willing to work 5.6 hours per week in the 
Colonia, and almost 25 percent wanted to work two hours per week (Figure 2).We also 
asked the participants how many hours they believed others were willing to volunteer for 
the Colonia. On average, fishermen believed that others would contribute 4.8 hours of 
                                                 
4
 The Colonia is a fishing association that was formed by the representatives of the MC and the fishermen 
in the protected area with the aim of helping the fishermen to organize themselves. It is through the 
Colonia, for example, that fishermen can receive a fishing card which, according to a recent plan of the 
regional government, will entitle the fishermen to transfer payments during the recovery period of the fish. 
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work per week, and 84.6 % believed that the others would work for at least two hours per 
week in the Colonia.  
 
Proposal 2: Self-monitoring 
 
Most fishermen wished more controls preventing that small fish and shrimp were caught 
or sold. According to the fishermen there were at the time few controls by the responsible 
governmental institution for inspection, the IBAMA (Brazilian Institute of Environment 
and Renewable Natural Resources). Many fishermen learned during their discussions that 
they need to monitor themselves which size of fish and shrimp are caught by others in 
order to avoid over-fishing and to enforce the law specifying the minimum size of fish 
and shrimp to be caught. The proposal suggested that inspection would be more effective 
if the fishermen themselves would denounce misbehaviour and report it to the IBAMA. 
We asked the fishermen about their willingness to denounce misbehaviour at several 
levels of severity. The fishermen varied considerably in their willingness to denounce 
(Table 2). In the second questionnaire 16 fishermen claimed that they would never 
denounce another fisherman who caught fish or shrimp smaller than the minimum size, 
35 fishermen would only denounce another fisherman whose catch included a large 
fraction of small fish, and more than half of the fishermen would already report another 
fisherman catching a few small fish. We also wanted to know how many out of ten 
fishermen they believed were willing to denounce misbehaviour. Almost 50% believed 
that at least five out of ten fishermen would denounce misbehaviour, with an average 
estimate of 6.2. 
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<Insert Table 2 here > 
 
Proposal 3: Replacing plastic-bottle traps by more sustainable traps 
 
At present, modified plastic bottles, or garrafas, are the standard gear to catch shrimp. 
Garrafas are locally believed to be harmful for the shrimp population because small 
shrimp can be caught in a large quantity with these traps. Locals think that these traps 
may be the main reason for the diminishing shrimp population. Some years ago, another 
trap, the so-called cofo, was used more frequently. The cofo is a bamboo basket in which 
mainly big shrimp get caught. One of the reasons why the cofo was replaced by the 
garrafas is that the material to manufacture cofos is comparatively expensive. The MC 
was already aware that it would be important that fishermen could obtain the necessary 
materials at an affordable price and was already looking for an organization that was 
willing to donate bamboo for this purpose. The third proposal was thus to replace 
garrafas with cofos, that is, fishermen would have to hand over a considerable fraction of 
their garrafas in exchange for receiving bamboo to manufacture cofos. We asked the 
fishermen, how many of their garrafas they were maximally willing to give up if in return 
they received bamboo for manufacturing 120 cofos (Figure 3). Around 70 percent were 
willing to give at least 120 garrafas in exchange for material for 120 cofos. We also asked 
the fishermen how many unsustainable traps they believed the other fishermen of their 
community were willing to hand over in exchange for materials to manufacture 
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sustainable traps. The average estimate was 222 garrafas, with 67% of the fishermen 
expecting that others would hand over 120 or more. 
 
6. Results 
 
In this section, we analyze the impact of participation and leader opinion on the 
willingness to contribute to the proposals and how willingness to contribute was related 
to individual variables such as socioeconomic status and beliefs about the contribution of 
other fishermen to sustainable resource use. 
 
6.1. Influence of participation, opinion leaders and individual beliefs on stated 
willingness to contribute (WTC) 
 
Results of the analyses of the influence of participation, opinion leaders and individual 
beliefs on the willingness to contribute to the three proposals are summarized in Tables 
4–6 and 8–10. The explanatory variables included in the models are presented in Table 3. 
 
<Insert Table 3 here > 
 
Participatory process and willingness to contribute 
 
Our results suggest that the initiated participatory process can increase the willingness to 
contribute. The fishermen who took part in a participatory process were more willing to 
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contribute to proposal 2, that is, they were more willing to denounce fishing 
misbehaviour (Table 4). The participation dummy is positive and significant on the 90 
percent level (models 2 and 3), although not significant in the models with all controls. In 
models 4 and 5 where we do not control for the belief about the mesh size other 
fishermen use, the participation dummy is positive but not yet significant. 
 
<Insert Table 4 here > 
 
Leader opinion and willingness to contribute 
 
Leader opinion had a significant effect in the last proposal (Table 5). In models 2 and 3 
the leaders‘ opinions significantly affected the willingness to exchange garrafas. 
Fishermen who were informed about the opinion of the leader were willing to contribute 
55 garrafas more on average. However, how strongly the leaders supported the proposal 
did not matter. In the other two proposals, there was no effect of the opinion leader 
dummy or the direction of the dummy. It seems, if at all, that just access to information, 
but not the direction of it, had influenced willingness fishermen to contribute to a 
proposal. 
 
< Insert Table 5 here > 
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Beliefs and willingness to contribute 
 
We found that beliefs played an important role for each of our three proposals. In Tables 
5 and 6, the belief variable is always significant at the 99 percent level, and in Table 4 it 
is significant at the 95 percent level. Also, the coefficients are large; for instance, 
fishermen who believed the other fishermen were willing to volunteer in the Colonia one 
hour more expressed a willingness to volunteer about 50 minutes longer (Table 6). 
Furthermore, they were willing to hand over about 30 garrafas more if they believed the 
others handed over 100 garrafas more (Table 5). Moreover, they were also more inclined 
to denounce misbehaviour if they believed the others would do so as well. 
 
<Insert Table 6 here > 
 
Beliefs and socioeconomic variables 
 
Since beliefs had a strong influence on the willingness to contribute to the three proposals 
developed by the fishermen, we also examined how socioeconomic variables were 
associated with the beliefs and whether they were different for fishermen who took part 
in the participatory process (Table 7). We use regression analyses (OLS) for all three 
beliefs. The socioeconomic variables we used in the analyses were education, age, gender 
and religiosity. For two of the three beliefs, we found no significant associations with the 
socioeconomic variables. For the belief in the last proposal, we found gender and 
education to be weakly significant. Women seemed to have more negative beliefs than 
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men; they believed that the other fishermen would hand in 88 garrafas less than the men 
believed. Religious fishermen were somewhat more optimistic and believed other 
fishermen would hand in more garrafas in exchange of cofos. In all three belief measures, 
we found no differences for fishermen who took part in the participatory process; i.e. 
fishermen who were assigned to the participatory treatment did not have more or less 
optimistic beliefs than fishermen who were assigned to the control group. Finally, we 
tested for indirect effects of participation by including the interaction beliefs x 
participation in the models to explain willingness to contribute. None of these 
interactions was significant at the 10 percent level. 
 
<Insert Table 7 here > 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
The aim of this research was to examine the effects of a participatory process on the 
willingness to contribute to cooperative common-pool resource management in a 
protected area in Brazil. We conducted a field experiment to isolate the effects of public 
participation in the design of resource management proposals. In a community-level 
experimental treatment we manipulated the opportunity for community participation in 
developing proposals for cooperative resource management. In a second treatment, we 
manipulated individual access to local expert evaluations of the resulting resource 
management proposals. 
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 The experiment demonstrated that it is possible to experimentally investigate how 
public involvement affects cooperation in community-based resource management. Our 
results suggest that a participatory approach in developing management proposals may 
promote cooperation in situations where resources are difficult to monitor and where 
efficient management may hence rely on informal sanctioning institutions. In particular, 
we found some evidence that the participatory process initiated in this study made 
fishermen think about the role of self-monitoring in resource management; under the 
participation treatment, the fishermen tended to be more willing to denounce fishing 
misbehaviour. This finding is in agreement with results of laboratory experiments 
showing that altruistic punishment of un-cooperative acts is a key element in promoting 
cooperation (e.g. Fehr and Gächter, 2002). 
The evidence for effects of leader opinions was relatively weak. We found a 
significant effect on responses about the willingness to change unsustainable traps, but 
the direction of the leader opinion was not systematically related to the responses. A 
possible explanation is that the fishermen had in this case already formed consistent 
beliefs and willingness to contribute to the proposals — even without access to the advice 
of their community leaders. This finding contrasts with the results of Schläpfer and 
Soliva (2008) and Schläpfer et al. (2008) who showed that knowledge of expert 
evaluations can strongly affect stated preferences for public goods. 
A strong pattern in our data is that beliefs and the willingness to contribute are 
highly correlated. Many fishermen reported to contribute more if they believed others 
would contribute as well. While this correlative result does not allow a direct causal 
interpretation, our finding is at least consistent with the interpretation that many 
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fishermen are conditionally cooperative (see Frey and Meier, 2004; Shang and Croson, 
2005). In principle at least, participatory processes should thus offer an opportunity to 
favourably influence beliefs. Our findings suggest that an increased attention to beliefs 
may be useful for a better understanding of individual cooperation in the management of 
common-pool resources. The enhanced communication initiated by participatory research 
could help develop reputation and trust among the participants, and this may in turn 
change the beliefs in a direction that is favourable for successful collective action. 
Our findings possibly underestimate the potential of the participatory process. 
Due to time and resource constraints, we could only begin a participatory process. 
Insights into the effects of an extended process of communication and deliberation about 
cooperative resource management are currently examined in ongoing field research in the 
study area. 
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 Table 1 — Number of participants in the first and second questionnaires 
Community 
 
Number of participants 
First questionnaire 
Number of participants 
Second questionnaire 
A 26 20 
B 31 20 
C 26 22 
D 42 31 
E 46 29 
F 26 21 
Total 197 143 
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    Table 2 — Threshold for willingness to denounce (= proposal 2) 
 
Never, 
irrespective of 
the degree of 
misbehaviour 
If catch contains… 
…a lot of 
small 
fish/shrimp 
…some 
small 
fish/shrimp 
…a bit of 
small 
fish/shrimp 
…little bit 
small 
fish/shrimp 
Number of observations 16 35 5 6 81 
Percentage 11.2 24.5 3.5 4.2 56.6 
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Table 3 — Explanatory variables used in the models (SD indicates the standard deviation) 
Variable Description   
Explanatory variables Mean SD 
Participation Variable for participation treatment: 0 = no participation; 1 = with 
participation 
  
Opinion leader (o.l.) Variable for information treatment: 0 = participant was not 
informed; 1 = informed 
  
Community Communities: A, B, C, D, E and F.    
Direction of the o.l. The direction of the opinion of the leader: -1 = the leader had 
―much doubt‖; 0 = he had ―no opinion‖ or the leader had ―little 
doubt‖; and 1 = he had ―no doubt‖ 
  
Group Refers to the interaction between the variables: community, 
opinion leader and direction of the opinion leader 
  
Age Age of fishermen in years 36.5 13.4 
Gender 0 = male; 1 = female 0.115 0.321 
Education Years spent in school 3.67 2.93 
Religiosity Religiosity of fishermen: 0 = ―without religion‖; 1 = ―not 
religious‖; 2 =  ―a little bit‖; 3 = ―a bit‖; 4  = ‖ some‖; and 5 = 
―very religious‖ 
3.42 1.31 
Caught fish Fish caught per week in kilograms 11.45 11.17 
Number of garrafas Number of plastic-bottle traps in possession of fishermen 309.6 196.2 
Belief mesh size other 
communities 
Beliefs on the mesh size fishermen form from other communities 
use 
7.39 1.38 
Field belief proposal 1 Belief on others‘ willingness to contribute to the Colonia in 
working hours 
6.15 3.07 
Field belief proposal 2 Belief on how many out of 10 fishermen would denounce someone 
to the IBAMA selling small fish/shrimp 
4.85 4.78 
Field belief proposal 3 Belief on how many plastic-bottle traps other fishermen would 
hand in if they received materials to make 120 cofos 
221.6 198.5 
Dependent variables   
Proposal 1 Willingness to contribute to the Colonia in working hours 5.60 5.25 
Proposal 2 Threshold at which fishermen would  be willing to denounce 
someone to the IBAMA: 0  = ―I would not denounce‖; 1 = he sells 
―a little bit‖ of small shrimp and fish; 2 =  he sells ―a bit‖ of small 
shrimp and fish; 3 = he sells ―some‖ small shrimp and fish; and 4 
= he sells ―a lot‖ of small shrimp and fish 
2.71 1.59 
Proposal 3 Number of plastic-bottle traps fishermen would be willing to hand 
in if they received materials to make 120 cofos  
179.4 141.6 
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Table 4 — Willingness to denounce misbehaviour (logistic regression) 
Model 1 2 3 4 5 
Participation 0.936                 
(0.584) 
0.922*       
(0.548) 
0.887*        
(0.524) 
0.792          
(0.517) 
0.804        
(0.514) 
Opinion leader (o.l.) -0.400            
(1.080) 
-0.335        
(0.533) 
-0.389        
(0.516) 
-0.359       
(0.511) 
-0.450       
(0.507) 
Direction of the o.l. 0.080            
(1.110) 
    
Field belief proposal 2 0.213**            
(0.093) 
0.214 **        
(0.092) 
0.214**        
(0.086) 
0.215**        
(0.086) 
 
Education    0.054                    
(0.113) 
0.054       
(0.112) 
   
Age   0.030              
(0.026) 
0.030       
(0.026) 
   
Gender -0.607                    
(0.776) 
-0.601       
(0.766) 
   
Religiosity -0.146                      
(0.234) 
-0.146        
(0.232) 
   
Belief mesh size other 
communities 
0.191                      
(0.209) 
0.194        
(0.206) 
0.148       
(0.194) 
  
N 135 135 139 140 140 
McFadden‘s R2 0.082 0.082 0.074 0.066 0.023 
Notes: *** 99-percent significance, ** 95-percent significance; * 90-percent significance; 
numbers represent linear estimates and standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table 5 — Willingness to exchange garrafas (OLS) 
Model 1 2 3 4 
Constant 20.4 
(96.7) 
2.0 
(69.8) 
109.7 
(24.7) 
108.6 
(21.4) 
Participation 23.1         
(26.3) 
8.8                
(24.0) 
-33.6                
(23.3) 
-36.2               
(25.3) 
Opinion leader (o.l.) 53.3           
(56.7) 
54.9**       
(22.4) 
55.0**          
(23.7) 
37.0         
(25.4) 
Direction of the o.l. -30.4         
(58.4) 
   
Field belief proposal 3 0.296***                
(0.056) 
0.291***        
(0.056) 
0.278***       
(0.059) 
 
Education    -6.28         
(5.050) 
-5.29                
(4.980) 
  
Age   0.66          
(1.110) 
0.46        
(1.100) 
  
Gender 4.7            
(33.0) 
2.1 
(32.9) 
  
Religiosity -5.5                 
(9.180) 
-6.230        
(9.210) 
  
Number of garrafas 0.345***       
(0.064) 
0.357***        
(0.063) 
  
N 115 115 123 123 
R squared 0.426 0.490 0.187 0.033 
Adj. R squared 0.371 0.364 0.167 0.017 
AIC 1647 1646 1792 1811 
BIC 1677 1671 1803 1820 
See notes in Table 4. 
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Table 6 — Willingness to contribute to the Colonia (OLS) 
Model 1 2 3 4 
Constant 1.780 
(2.540) 
1.730 
(2.500) 
1.565 
(0.558) 
5.857 
(0.745) 
Participation 0.120            
(0.899) 
0.105                       
(0.886) 
0.319                
(0.558) 
0.530 
(0.879) 
Opinion leader (o.l.) -0.770       
(2.940) 
-1.146        
(0.829) 
-0.478    
(0.559) 
-1.067 
(0.879) 
Direction of the o.l. -0.390         
(2.960) 
   
Field belief proposal 1 0.885***              
(0.085) 
0.883***        
(0.084) 
0.848***       
(0.059) 
 
Education    -0.096     
(0.189) 
-0.090        
(0.183) 
  
Age  -0.071*      
(0.042) 
-0.070*          
(0.041) 
  
Gender 1.10           
(1.220) 
1.080          
(1.210) 
  
Religiosity 0.807**        
(0.356) 
0.081**       
(0.354) 
  
Caught fish -0.020               
(0.038) 
-0.021        
(0.038) 
  
Number of garrafas 0.001             
(0.002) 
0.001           
(0.002) 
  
N 94 94 143 143 
R squared 0.599 0.599 0.605 0.013 
Adj. R squared 0.551 0.556 0.597 < 0 
AIC 691 689 1058 1187 
BIC 719 714 1070 1196 
See notes in Table 4. 
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Table 7 — Field beliefs (OLS)  
Dependent 
variable 
Field belief 
proposal 1 
Field belief 
proposal 2 
Field belief 
proposal 3 
Constant 2.561 
(1.721) 
7.2697.13 
(1.332) 
222.33198.7 
(89.629) 
Education    0.245        
(0.172) 
-0.105        
(0.108) 
-4.178        
(7.578) 
Age   0.54        
(0.037) 
-0.036        
(0.024) 
-1.543      
(1.628) 
Gender -0.119     
(1.215) 
-0.939        
(0.763) 
-88.304*                            
(51.027) 
Religiosity 
 
Participation 
-0.1898       
(0.350) 
0.282 
(0.830) 
0.255         
(0.220) 
-0.186 
(0.521) 
29.058*         
(14.573) 
-32.154 
(35.044) 
N 139 139 128 
R squared 0.022 0.037 0.06 
Adj. R squared < 0 0 0.025 
AIC 839 710 1720 
BIC 857 727 1737 
See notes in Table 4. 
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Figure legends 
 
Figure 1 — Overview of the experimental design and research process (WTC, MC, Q and 
C refer to willingness to contribute, Management Council, questionnaire and 
communities, respectively) 
 
Figure 2 — Willingness to contribute to the Colonia 
 
Figure 3 — Willingness to exchange garrafas 
 
 44 
APPENDIX 
 
 
 
Table 8 — Willingness to denounce misbehaviour (= proposal 2) 
 
Variable 
With socioeconomic variables Without socioeconomic variables 
DF SS F pr. Df SS F pr. 
Education 1 0.323 0.716    
Age 1 0.460 0.664    
Gender 1 2.097 0.354    
Religiosity 1 0.265 0.741    
Caught fish  1 0.269 0.740    
Number of garrafas 1 0.096 0.843    
Field belief proposal 2 1 10.900 0.037 1 34.090 < 0.001 
Participation 1 9.708 0.137* 1 14.669 0.073 
Community 4 11.240 0.521 4 10.058 0.617 
Opinion leader (o.l.) 1 3.065 0.264 1 2.240 0.312 
Direction of the o.l. 1 1.397 0.449 1 0.079 0.849 
Group 5 20.453 0.133 5 16.371 0.192 
Residual 74 172.536  129 280.156  
* Tested against variation between communities (line below) because all participants within a 
community either had or did not have participation. 
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Table 9 — Willingness to exchange garrafas (= proposal 3) 
 
Variables 
With socioeconomic variables Without socioeconomic variables 
DF SS F pr. DF SS F pr. 
Education 1 99312 0.008    
Age 1 8272 0.433    
Gender 1 55462 0.044    
Religiosity 1 1555 0.733    
Number of garrafas 1 421467 < 0.001    
Field belief proposal 3 1 307541 < 0.001 1 333614 < 0.001 
Participation 1 1515 0.518* 1 34232 0.289 
Community 4 12075 0.921 4 91763 0.420 
Opinion leader (o.l.) 1 80115 0.016 1 91763 0.035 
Direction of the o.l. 2 61090 0.107 2 35880 0.341 
Group 4 57813 0.369 4 73927 0.352 
Residual 96 1279788  109 1801573  
* See Table 8. 
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Table 10 — Willingness to contribute to the Colonia (= proposal 1) 
 
Variables 
With socioeconomic variables Without socioeconomic variables 
DF SS F pr. DF SS F pr. 
Education 1 0.490 0.857    
Age 1 7.970 0.469    
Gender 1 0 1    
Religiosity 1 41.560 0.101    
Caught fish 1 44.680 0.089    
Number of garrafas 1 15.420 0.315    
Field belief proposal 1 1 1704.310 < 0.001 1 2355.190 < 0.001 
Participation 1 0 1.000* 1 3.690 0.569 
Community 4 49.060 0.463 4 38.430 0.740 
Opinion leader (o.l.) 1 37.530 0.119 1 9.730 0.346 
Direction of the o.l. 1 3.180 0.647 1 4.200 0.535 
Group 5 57.970 0.574 5 96.370 0.123 
Residual 74 1113.620  129 1402.020  
* See Table 8. 
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